Joe Cannon and the Revolt of 1910

Andrew Taylor
Eureka College
ataylor@eureka.edu

Abstract
Did George Norris realize what he was doing when he presented his resolution before the House on March 17, 1910?  Did he realize that his actions would quickly humble the most powerful man in Washington D.C., and turn the Speaker of the House into little more than a presiding officer? This paper explores the political career of Joseph G. Cannon, his rise and fall from power.  This paper looks to show how Cannon’s change from practicing traditional party politics to carrying out his own personal partisanship lead to his downfall as Speaker of the House, and brought about the use of the seniority system in Congress.   

“Cannon was born of God-fearing and man-loving parents.  He made himself and did a damn poor job of it.” – Joseph G. Cannon
	If one were to mention a Southern born, prairie lawyer from Illinois that made it big in Washington, instantaneously Abraham Lincoln would spring to mind; but he was not the only one, Joseph G. Cannon fits such a description as well.  Born in New Garden, North Carolina on May 7, 1836 to Quaker parents, Joe Cannon was a man of pioneer stock.  In 1840, Cannon’s father moved his family to Annapolis, Indiana where he died tragically in 1851.  Forced to quit his studies at age fourteen, Cannon found a job to help support his family.  Five years later, he had finally made enough money to begin studying law, the profession that eventually brought Cannon to Illinois.  Once reaching Illinois, Cannon moved two more times from Shelbyville to Tuscola finally settling in Danville, Illinois.  Drawn into the world of politics while still living in Tuscola, it would be in Danville where Cannon would step out onto the national scene and eventually rise and fall as Speaker of the House.  Throughout his career “Uncle Joe” Cannon, as he was soon known, practiced party politics, but in the end, his personal partisanship would lead to his downfall.
	Cannon’s political career on the national level began in 1870, when he ran for the Congressional seat in Illinois’ 14th district, later to become the 18th district.  Cannon's Democratic opponent won, but in 1872 that changed when Cannon rode to victory all the way to Washington on the coattails of President Grant (Rager, 10).  It was not long before Cannon made his first, and probably only, legislative impact in Congress before he became Speaker.  Appointed to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Cannon served as the chairman of a subcommittee to revise the postal laws.  While serving as subcommittee chair, Cannon introduced and defended a measure establishing the pound rate of paying postage on second-class mail as well as one allowing free shipment of public documents under the signature of a member of Congress.  Cannon defended these two measures on the floor of the House, and while doing so William Walter Phelps of New Jersey interrupted saying, “The gentleman from Illinois must have oats in his pocket,” Cannon promptly responded, “I understand the gentleman.  Yes I have oats in my pocket and hay-seed in my hair. . .” (Gwinn, 28).  Thus, the image of the “hay-seed Congressman” was born, and it was one that Cannon wore well.
	Cannon would remain very proud of his passage of minor legislation, and would continue to speak about it during campaigns since there was not much else to his name.  Throughout his political career Cannon remained relatively partisan, either approving or disapproving legislation according to the Republican Party’s policies.  Though Cannon would never change his voting patterns, in 1888 the House of Representatives acquired a completely new change in direction.  That year’s Speaker race involved three major contenders Thomas B. Reed of Maine, William McKinley of Ohio, and Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois.  Unfortunately for Cannon and McKinley, Reed became Speaker but those two did not walk away empty handed; both received majority seats on the Rules Committee.  With the selection of Thomas, soon to be “Czar,” Reed as Speaker, the House would undergo major rules changes instituted by Reed with the help of his trusty lieutenant “Uncle Joe” (Rager, 12). 
	When Reed first became Speaker, the Republicans had a small majority and the Democrats’ practice of remaining silent during quorum count made it difficult to carry out legislation.  In 1890, to overcome the issue of the vanishing quorum, Reed began having the clerk record the silent Democrats as present.  The Democrats, finding this move highly unethical and illegal, expressed their dissatisfaction by referring to Reed as tyrant and czar.  In order to make his new procedure an established custom Reed had Cannon devise a plan to revise the rules for counting a quorum, this was the birth of “Reed’s Rules.”  On February 6, 1890, Cannon submitted the Rules Committee’s majority report to the House and on February 10, it went up for debate.  This new code stated “No dilatory motion shall be entertained by the Speaker” (Gwinn, 71), set the quorum at 100, and most importantly legalized Reed’s quorum counting activities (Gwinn, 65, 67, 71-73).  
With the passage of “Reed’s Rules”, the Republicans could carry through legislation with ease because the Speaker did not consider any motion thought to deliberately slow down the workings of the House, and the need for 100 votes made achieving a quorum much easier. Unfortunately for the Republican Party and especially Joe Cannon, 1890 ended in a loss in the Congressional elections.  When the Democrats took over in 1891, they returned to the old rules of running things and accomplished nothing in the process because Republicans merely reverted to carrying out the same filibustering tactics the Democrats used before the passage of “Reed’s Rules.”  The Democrats soon learned that they could not effectively run the government without some type of order so they eventually adopted "Reed's Rules" for themselves.  This move pleased Reed who congratulated the House on a wise action; however Cannon, who had been re-elected in 1892, “taunted Speaker Charles Crisp for surrendering his principles to mere expediency and for ‘holding goods that he obtained under false pretences’" (Gwinn, 79).  
When the Republicans retook the House in 1896 for the 54th session of Congress, Cannon returned to chair the Appropriations Committee.  First appointed by Reed during the 51st Congress, and again during the 55th, 56th, and 57th, as Appropriations chair Cannon earned quite a name for himself before his assent to the Speaker’s chair.  Referred to as the “The Watchdog of the Treasury” and “Cerberus of the Money-box,” Cannon often said, “’You think my business is to make appropriations, but it is not.  It is to prevent their being made’” (Gwinn, 84).  Cannon frequently rejected requests brought before committee; he knew how to say “No.”  Cannon drew the government’s purse strings tight while keeping a watchful eye on the government’s budget sheet (Gwinn, 84-85, 87). 
During his tenure as Appropriations chair Cannon became used to hearing pleas for more money from countless people and organizations.  Some of the biggest pleas came from Theodore Roosevelt who, at the time, was acting as a Civil Service Commissioner and later an Assistant Naval Secretary.  During the 51st Congress, Roosevelt, fearing the cut off of the Commission’s entire fund, urged those in favor of the Merit System to attack Cannon publicly.  This was perhaps not the wisest move on Roosevelt’s part because his carelessness with money matters caused him to continuously ask for more clerks or funds for the Civil Service Commission as well as more ships for the navy.  Many of these requests were not granted at once, which annoyed Roosevelt.  Little did they know they would have to learn to work together later in their political careers, one as President and the other as Speaker of the House (Gwinn, 86-87).
Cannon’s problems reached far beyond Roosevelt during his time as Appropriation’s chair, there were also a few controversial issues that he had to deal with.  Cannon would always be known for his conservative ideas on spending the nation’s money, and things seemed no different when “Professor Samuel P. Langley of the Smithsonian Institution asked for $10,000 to experiment with a flying machine.” (Gwinn, 89)  In the end, Cannon was won over and got the appropriation through the House, the controversy came when the machine took a nose dive into the Potomac ending Cannon’s progressive undertakings.  Cannon also voiced a strong opinion against the proposition placed before the House to have the government pay the losses of the Buffalo Pan-American Exposition of 1901, believing it wanton extravagance, unfortunately for him the proposition passed (Gwinn, 89-90). 
Cannon’s most important task as Appropriations chair came from a request by President McKinley in 1898.  President McKinley, sensing an approaching war with Spain, sought Cannon’s advice on securing extraordinary funds.  Cannon had a plan, suggesting that the President deliver a message to Congress requesting $50,000,000 for national defense.  McKinley liked the plan, but left the message up to Cannon who delivered it on March 8.  According to Cannon’s plan the money would last out the year, cover the time that Congress was not in session, and require no new taxes since the Treasury had the funds.  Cannon’s plan won over both sides of the aisle; Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats alike.  The proposal passed easily 313-0-44, but the floor’s enthusiasm was not felt from the Speaker’s chair.  Reed strongly opposed the House’s actions believing them impracticable.  Following the war he was out of sympathy with the Republican Party in its treatment of the former Spanish colonial possessions, which lead to his resignation on September 4, 1899.  Reed’s resignation put Cannon one step closer to ascending to the Speaker’s chair, but he would have to wait since Reed’s immediate successor was David B. Henderson of Iowa (Gwinn, 91-93, 97).
 “Uncle Joe’s” time finally came in 1903, when Speaker Henderson decided to retire from the House and his fellow Iowan, William Peters Hepburn, declined to seek the position feeling that Iowa should not have two Speakers in a row.  With Henderson and Hepburn out of the way, Cannon’s assent to the Speakership became clear, and on November 7, 1903 the Republican caucus selected him for Speaker.  This was no surprise to anyone, not even the Roosevelt Administration, which as early as 1902 congratulated Cannon on the certainty that he would be selected Speaker for the next session of Congress (Gwinn, 97, 99).  According to an article in Harper’s Weekly, Cannon would not have been Roosevelt’s first choice for Speaker because their policies did not entirely harmonize.  Essentially, Roosevelt and Cannon were on opposite ends of the Republican Party, but Cannon was a man to be trusted to keep the best interests of the party in mind (Harper’s Weekly, 70).  
Despite their past experiences with each other and their occasionally opposing views Cannon and Roosevelt managed to form a working partnership between the While House and the Capital Building.  Roosevelt, in order to start their relationship off on the right foot, began requesting Cannon’s advice when it became evident that he would be the next Speaker of the House.  Roosevelt realized that Cannon could not be expected to rubber stamp decisions without first being allowed to give his own input; he was not another David Henderson and would not be dictated to.  It was not long before Cannon and Roosevelt were meeting regularly when Congress was in session; often meeting two to three times a week, even daily.  In 1905, looking to remain on Cannon’s good side as well as appease his anger Roosevelt began the annual custom of the Speaker’s Dinner.  Cannon had issues with receiving inferior seating to the Supreme Court Justices at a dinner in their honor.  Roosevelt’s move worked, allowing him to remain within Cannon’s good graces, which would prove the ticket to his control over Congress (Rager, 34-36). 
For the most part the Cannon-Roosevelt relationship remained rather solid, with only a few minor snags now and again.  At the very beginning of Cannon’s Speakership some trouble arose giving the impression that the partnership would collapse before it were even allowed to fully develop.  Stock prices fell on Wall Street, and the New York financial institutions struggled to meet the demands of interior banks requesting money owed to them.  Fearing the effects this would have on the outcome of the 1904 elections, the Republican leadership began considering remedies.  A currency reform plan was developed by big Republican names within the Senate and readily endorsed by Roosevelt, who hoped Cannon would put aside his reservations about currency reform and stand with the party leadership.  Cannon however felt that there was plenty of money in the treasury and felt that Wall Street had brought this on itself by overspeculation; being a small town banker he was also not prepared to support a plan that favored large banks.  The situation improved however without a single piece of legislation when, in the fall of 1903, Treasury Secretary Leslie M. Shaw made $40,000,000 available to the New York Banks.  With that this minor snag in the Cannon-Roosevelt relationship was resolved (Rager, 36). 
After the bank crisis in 1903, Cannon and Roosevelt were able to maintain a relatively stable relationship because Roosevelt continued to carry out the policies of the McKinley administration.  In fact the Republican national convention of 1904 was dominated by conservatives, many hand picked by Roosevelt himself, including the presiding officer “Uncle Joe” Cannon.  This convention gave the conservative wing of the party faith in Roosevelt, who received the nomination for President and adopted a platform with no inclination for progressive action.  The Cannon-Roosevelt relationship changed when Roosevelt was elected President in his own right because at that point Roosevelt’s progressive inclinations became more distinct.  By the time Roosevelt and Cannon were both starting their second terms in their respective positions railroad regulation and tariff reform were the major issues facing the country.  The Cannon-Roosevelt relationship began to feel the strain from the continuous urge for reform, along with continuing issues of financial problems, conservation, and labor.  Roosevelt was willing to press for reform, becoming irritated with Congress when his measures were not passed; Cannon however stood idly by becoming less and less enthusiastic about Roosevelt’s proposals (Gwinn, 119, 136). 
In his annual message before Congress in 1905, Roosevelt stressed the need for reform on several levels, particularly the issue of railroad rates, pure food legislation, conservation, as well as organized labor.  Interesting enough Roosevelt’s message contained no mention of the tariff or its possible reform.  It is believed that Roosevelt removed the statement pertaining to the tariff in a compromise with Senator Aldrich and Speaker Cannon.  The only way Roosevelt would see his railroad legislation passed through Congress would be if no change were made to the tariff.  Feeling railroad rate reform to be an important issue that could not be turned down, Roosevelt complied making no reference to the tariff in his annual message (Gwinn, 136-139). 
Since May of that year, Roosevelt advocated placing the full authority of fixing railroad rates in the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission.  By December, he had moderated his position somewhat by simply giving the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to supervise and regulate the railroad rates subject to judicial review.  On January 27, 1906, William Hepburn, Chairmen of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reported the bill on the floor which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the power “to investigate complaints that a rate was unfair or a regulation unjust” as well as determine a reasonable rate (Gwinn, 142).  As promised Cannon did nothing to stall the bill’s passage, and when it did pass the House on February 8, 1906, 346 to 7, he actually received credit for his leadership and wisdom.  Unfortunately when the bill reached the Senate on February 23, Senator Aldrich tried to stall and prevent its passage by handing it off to Senator Tillman of South Carolina, a Democrat who was not in the good graces of the White House.  This move stalled the bill in the Senate until May 18, 1906 when it finally passed 71 to 3.  On June 29, 1906 the Hepburn Bill finally became law (Gwinn, 141-145).    
At the same time the Roosevelt administration pushed the Hepburn Bill through Congress it also looked to get pure food legislation through as well.  Cannon would prove to be a problem for the Roosevelt administration on this issue because he remained blind to the seriousness of the issue.  Prior to 1906, the federal government lacked effective means of inspecting the possible adulteration of food and drugs as well as the sanitation standards of the meat packing industry, and despite the fact that pure food legislation had been placed before Congress for more than a decade all measures addressing misbranding and adulteration failed.  Before 1906, the House passed pure food legislation twice only to see it die in the Senate because of opposition led by Senator Aldrich.  By 1906, the Senate was leading the race to pass pure food legislation, and on February 21, a bill authorized by Senator Weldon B. Heyburn of Idaho was passed 63 to 4 only to be stalled in the House until June.  When Roosevelt questioned Cannon on whether the pure food bill would pass in the House, Cannon responded “that the pure food bill was on the Calendar; the House could consider it any day a majority wished to do so” (Gwinn, 151).  Finally on June 23, the pure food bill passed the House by a vote of 241 to 17.  While the delay would be blamed on poor management by the bill’s sponsors, it was difficult for Cannon to avoid criticism.  As Speaker, Cannon could control which bills were brought to the floor and he chose who would be recognized to speak, the delay solely rested on his shoulders and personal politics (Gwinn, 146-148, 151, 156).  
Of all the major issues of the Roosevelt administration conservation became one of the biggest.  Roosevelt took a more personal interest in conservation of natural resources of all the progressive reforms during his Presidency, and standing there to oppose him was none other than “Uncle Joe” himself.  Cannon’s opposition to conservation measures reached back to 1902 when he was still Appropriations chair.  That year Congress reviewed the Lacey Bill, which “sought to transfer all forest reserves to the control of the Department of Agriculture” (Rager, 45).  Cannon used his influence to thwart the bills passage stopping conservation issues for a time.  To Cannon conservation seemed just another way to waste public money, and that was something he would not allow.  During his tenure as Speaker, Cannon’s opposition to conservation mainly stemmed from the creation of reserves in the Southern Appalachians and White Mountains.  Ignoring recommendations from the President and House Agricultural Committee that the reserves be created, Cannon referred the matter to the House Judicial Committee to examine the constitutionality of the reserves.  Though the Judiciary Committee found that the federal government could not seize land solely for reserves they could do so to improve navigation on lakes and streams; a bill was drafted exactly for that purpose but Cannon buried it in Rules (Rager, 45-46).
Cannon’s dispute over conservation and pure food issues, though memorable, do not compare to his battle with organized labor.  Throughout his tenure as Speaker, Cannon remained at odds with Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.), by the 1906 elections the feud finally came to a head.  Gompers, though opposed to directly involving the A.F.L. in politics, changed his attitude when earlier that year Cannon was unwilling to listen to the Labor’s Bill of Grievances.  This document, formulated by Gompers, stressed the belief that “anti-immigration legislation was unenforced, the anti-trust laws had been turned against laborers, and injunctions were often used to break strikes.” (Rager, 108)  Gompers accused Cannon of selecting committees specifically for the purpose of defeating labor legislation; this angered the Speaker who informed Gompers he stood against class legislation.  To show that the union meant business, Gompers began blacklisting Congressmen, which merely outraged the Speaker more.  For a short time Cannon worried that even he could possibly loose his seat, but when the A.F.L. backed the Socialist party candidate, his worry subsided and he easily won reelection (Rager, 107-108, 111-113).
Cannon’s reelection merely intensified Gompers resolve to continue the fight partially because earlier that year Gompers was informed that several Republicans and Democrats were not happy with how Cannon ran the House.  These “would be Insurgents” wanted to know if Gompers would be willing to participate in an event in order to reform the House Rules; Gompers agreed, attending several of the early Insurgent meetings.  This eventually ended because many of the Insurgents were willing to keep Cannon as Speaker as long as the rules were changed, but Gompers wanted him completely removed from power.  Gompers would continue to criticize Cannon, and in October 1907 he issued a four page proclamation asking all the trade unions petition their congressman not to support Cannon for the Speakership, this move failed and Cannon became Speaker once again (Rager, 113-114). 
By 1908, Gompers and Cannon were at each others throats once again, this time at the Republican National Convention.  That year, Cannon was a contender for the Republican presidential nomination, but Gompers, who headed the A.F.L. delegation at the convention, stood in his way.  The A.F.L. demanded an anti-injunction plank be added to the party platform, but Cannon would have none of it, which is probably the reason why William Taft received the party’s nomination.  In the end a diluted version of the anti-injunction plank was added to the platform, and Gompers pledged his support to the Democrats.  Though Cannon failed to capture the presidential nomination he succeeded in being reelected to the House, despite Gompers personally campaigning against him in Illinois.  Though still relatively popular in the fall of 1908, Cannon began to face more opposition from the mounting insurgency; he did however manage to hold on to his post as Speaker for the 61st Congress.  In 1910, the feud between Gompers and Cannon finally came to an end, when the Democrats gained control of the House and Champ Clark became Speaker (Rager, 115-117, 122-123).              
Not surprising the railroad, pure food, conservation, and labor issues would be used by the Insurgents in their case against Cannon in 1910, but a significant argument in their cause was Cannon’s abuse of his appointment power.  When Cannon first became Speaker he did very little to the leadership arrangement left behind by Henderson, but as time progressed, Cannon eventually appointed a group of committee chairmen whose beliefs were similar to his own.  Of all Cannon’s appointments three were most significant to him, Sereno E. Payne of New York, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee; John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, the number two man on the Rules and Ways and Means Committees; and James A. Tawney, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee.  These three men, all possessing sharp minds and strong wills, became part of Cannon’s inner circle helping him to control the functions of the House.  Of lesser significance, but still important, were men like “General Charles Grosvenor of Ohio, James R Mann of Illinois, James E. Watson of Indiana, William B. McKinley of Illinois, James S. Sherman of New York, Henry C. Loudenslager of New Jersey, and Joseph Sibley of New York. . . ” (Rager, 25-26).  It is most certain that all these men owed something to Cannon; his only request was their dependability and loyalty (Rager, 22-26).
Between the start of the 58th Congress and the start of the 61st Congress, Cannon’s appointment style changed substantially.  As mentioned before, when Cannon first became Speaker during the 58th Congress he made very few changes in the leadership left by Speaker Henderson; instead using his powers to promote party loyalty.  To examine this more closely, at the start of the 58th Congress there were 206 Republicans serving in the House, not including Cannon, yet according to the assignment notebook only 156 of these members issued assignment requests.  The other 50 Republicans are assumed to be senior members of the House, and with that it is assumed they sought reappointment to the committee upon which they served during the 57th Congress.  When deciding assignments during the 58th Congress, Cannon tended to favor Republicans who were noted experts, received some sort of endorsement, claimed an assignment would aid their reelection, tended to be more conservative, and supported his candidacy for Speaker.  Cannon followed a basic decision making processes of assigning members to committees; if they served on the committee before, with rare exceptions, they were returned, and if they requested a new committee assignment, they were assigned if it would best serve the Republicans’ policy goals.  For a good part of his tenure, Cannon stayed within the seniority norm of making appointments, near the end that began to change (Lawrence, 551, 554-556). 
By the start of the 61st Congress Cannon’s relationship with the House had soured, especially with his own party.  Throughout most of Cannon’s tenure as Speaker the Republican Party remained a unified body, but by the 61st Congress a significant progressive faction had emerged within its ranks.  Cannon’s relationship with the minority leader had also changed by the start of the 61st Congress because his friend John Sharp Williams no longer led the minority and instead the more partisan Champ Clark was leader.  Cannon knew full well that he would be facing some serious challenges during the new session of Congress.  That year 104 Republicans submitted a total of 221 committee assignment requests, and of those 221 requests only 88 were granted, 44 of which were reassignment requests.  This shows that Cannon continued to honor a member’s request to be reappointed, yet inconsistencies remained in Cannon’s appointments between the 58th and 61st Congress.  While Cannon tended to favor more conservative Republicans during the 58th Congress, during the 61st Congress he favored those who did not challenge his own grasp on power as well as those who supported his views on the tariff.  In a sense Cannon was not focused on protecting his party’s interests during the 61st Congress, but rather his own (Lawrence, 558-560).
Cannon’s actions throughout his tenure as Speaker, mainly near the end, led to the Insurgents and Democrats uniting to overthrow him in 1910.  This revolt did not just happen over night, since 1908 Cannon had faced criticism from the press and resentment from other House members.  Cannon’s biggest critic at the presses became Herman Ridder the Newspaper Publishers’ Association President.  Ridder had approached Cannon in January 1908 concerning the Stevens Bill, which would remove the tariff on pulp paper.  Cannon refused to listen, but Ridder approached Cannon once again, this time in May with a pledge that the publishers would support Cannon’s bid for the presidential nomination if Cannon would use his influence to push the bill through Congress.  Cannon refused to budge from his previous stance; the bill would never pass through Congress and the press seemingly turned on him because of it.  After the elections of 1908, Cannon was fully aware that his popularity in the House had been reduced, but he did not fully understand why since the House Rules had not changed since Speaker Reed put them into place by in 1890.  Cannon became convinced it was the fault of the press, which had been attacking him for more than a year; little did he know the problem ran much deeper than he imagined (Rager, 86-88, 129).
Cannon had no idea that the resentment he faced within the halls of Congress was the result of his own actions.  Many members of Congress considered Cannon to be out of touch with the mood of the times, still living and governing by the ideals of the 1800s.  While Cannon focused on past ways of running things, a new era of reform emerged bringing with it new ideas and changes to governing.  Despite the fact that Cannon was still personally more popular with the House than his mentor Thomas Reed, by this many considered him just as much a “Czar” as Reed.  Cannon’s opposition, initially a small group of progressive Republicans, felt that he was abusing many the powers granted to him as Speaker.  By this time, Cannon had taken up the habit of appointing committee chairmen based on how well an individual’s political outlook meshed with his; seniority had taken a back seat to Cannon’s agenda.  The Insurgents also did not like Cannon’s habit of refusing to recognize members on the floor who did not first clear their plans with him in his office.  They also did not like the Speakers power to either push through or stall bills he either approved of or rejected since Cannon tended to use this power for the latter; blocking many bills he opposed (Rager, 129-130).
Leading the way for the Insurgents were two western men, George Norris of Nebraska and Victor Murdock of Kansas.  Murdock was the more dynamic of the two and the natural spokesman for the Insurgent cause.  As a former newspaper editor, Murdock knew how to attract the press, giving the movement much needed publicity.  Where Murdock stood with regards to Cannon was that the Speaker and the Rules Committee prevented the proper function of a representative government.  Though not a firebrand like Murdock, Norris remained every bit an idealist, never compelled to follow party lines.  In 1907, when asked where he stood concerning the Speaker’s power Norris responded that he stood firmly with insurgency; after that point in time he assumed a leadership role within the movement.  A Harper’s Weekly article in March 1910, described Norris as “a shrewd, hard-headed man with endurance in controversy and the will to fight” (Lowry, 8).  Joining these men were Edmond H. Madison of Kansas, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, Charles A. Lindbergh of Minnesota, Charles G. Fowler of New Jersey, as well as thirty-five or so others.  This group became the Insurgents, united with the common goal to change the House rules (Rager, 130-131).
Cannon had little to suspect from the Insurgents during the first session of the 60th Congress because they did very little to oppose him.  Insurgent opposition first came on December 15, 1908, when a resolution for an eight member committee, five chosen by the Speaker and three by the minority leader, to report any desirable changes to the House Rules by February 1, 1909 was brought to the floor; this resolution never passed.  This failure merely intensified the Insurgents resolve for reform to the rules.  On February 9, 1909, twenty-nine insurgents submitted a three part resolution calling for the abolition of the Speaker’s power of appointment, reshaping the Rules Committee into a fifteen member body chosen by the House made up of nine majority and six minority members, as well as the establishment of a “Calendar Tuesday” on which committees would be called forward alphabetically to present legislation.  In response, John Dalzell, the number two man on the Rules Committee, issued a reform resolution on March 1, 1909 for a “Calendar Wednesday.”  If agreed upon, the resolution would allow for committees to be called once a week on “Calendar Wednesday” except during the last two weeks of each session; a majority vote of the House could dispense the call.  Dalzell’s resolution took the least objectionable of the Insurgents demands and adopted it for their own use.  This did not please the Insurgents, but rather infuriated many of them who saw it as little more than a cleaver trap.  When votes were cast, 168 were in favor of “Calendar Wednesday” and 163 were opposed, twenty-six being from the twenty-nine Insurgents (Gwinn, 240-243).
This would be a minor victory for Cannon and his supporters; the Insurgents would continue the contest when a special session of the 61st Congress met on March 15, 1909 to consider a revision of the tariff.  During this session Cannon became Speaker once again, with only twelve Insurgents voting against him.  Following Cannon’s reappointment, Representative Dalzell presented the usual motion to readopt the rules of the previous Congress for the current session.  Unlike previous sessions where the rules were readily adopted, when minority leader Champ Clark forced a roll call the rules were not readopted with a vote of 193 to 189.  Clark promptly offered a resolution depriving the Speaker of his power of appointment as well as setting up a fifteen member Rules Committee consisting of six Democrats, five Regular Republicans, and four Insurgent Republicans.  Unfortunately, Clark’s resolution was shot down when sixteen Democrats joined Cannon’s forces.  After the rejection of Clark’s resolution, John Fitzgerald, a New York Democrat, offered a proposal which did not touch the Speaker’s power but rather provided for a unanimous consent calendar as well as strengthened “Calendar Wednesday” by changing the majority vote requirement to a two-thirds vote.  Fitzgerald’s resolution ruled the day, passing by a vote of 211 to 172; this time twenty-three Democrats joined with Cannon (Gwinn, 143, 145-146).
With the Rules issue resolved for the moment, Congress went to work revising the tariff. On March 16, 1909 the House Ways and Means Committee reported a tariff bill; this was the beginning of the Payne-Aldrich tariff.  After three weeks of debate and countless revisions, including an amendment introduced by Norris reducing the duty on petroleum to one percent ad valorem, the bill passed the House on April 10 by a vote of 217 to 171.  The House version placed coal, hides, and iron on the free list, while duties were increased on hosiery and gloves.  When the bill reached the Senate, the duties on iron, hides, and coal were restored while the duties on lumber and cotton goods were increased.  The Senate version of the tariff bill added 847 amendments to the House bill, more than half of them increases dictated by special interests.  On July 8, after eleven weeks of debate, the Senate version of the bill finally passed 45 to 34.  The Conference Committee met from July 12 to July 29 to finalize the bill.  When they concluded the final draft duties on glass, lumber, coal were reduced, while duties on silk and cotton goods were increased, and hides and petroleum were placed on the free list.  The House passed the Conference Report on July 31 and the Senate approved it on August 5, but the bill was a far cry from revision (Gwinn, 250-253, 255, 257-258).
With the final passage of the Payne-Aldrich tariff Cannon began assigning committee posts for the 61st Congress; three Insurgents lost their chairmanships and were replaced with Cannon supporters.  At the same time President Taft contemplated a tour of Western states, in order to spread his opinion on the Payne-Aldrich tariff.  Coincidently enough, President Taft’s tour began in Insurgent country at Winona, Minnesota where he declared that the Republican platform had not promised to lower all tariff duties.  Taft’s speech pleased Cannon, who thought it a “very politic, forceful, square speech, and it ought to have the effect of strengthening the Republican party all over the country” (Gwinn, 264).  Unfortunately, Taft’s speech merely agitated the Insurgents more; Taft claimed criticism of the Insurgents had not been his intent.  At the same time Taft’s attitude toward Cannon was difficult to determine since publicly he endorsed him yet would privately criticize him.  The Taft administration was on the defensive before the close of the first session of the 61st Congress, and the Insurgents played unto the public interest that Taft’s and Cannon’s unwillingness to collaborate resulted in a restraint on the public interest.  The Insurgent cause grew stronger with the passage of time (Gwinn, 261, 264-268).
1910 brought more trouble for the Taft administration as well as the Regulars in Congress.  When the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee’s January 9 newsletter announced it would only be supporting Regulars in the upcoming election George Norris asked President Taft if his colleagues were being penalized for their war on Cannonism; Taft assured him that they were not.  That same month, the Balligner-Pinchot controversy over natural resource conservation arose, bringing more stress to the Taft administration and more power to the Insurgency.  The problem started when an order withdrawing public lands in Wyoming and Montana containing water power sites was canceled.  Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot publicly charged Interior Secretary Richard A. Balligner with showing favoritism toward corporations seeking water power sites.  A joint Congressional investigating committee was formed consisting of six members from both houses of Congress; choosing the six House members would cause some trouble for Cannon.  On January 19, 1910, George Norris offered an amendment to the resolution in which the House itself would appoint the investigators and not the Speaker; Norris' amendment passed 149 to 146.  This Insurgent victory, though only a minor one, foreshadowed the event to come two months later (Gwinn, 277-278, 283-285).
By March, tensions had become high within the House chambers, and a group of “near Insurgents” had developed within the Republican Party.  These once loyal supporters of Cannon were beginning to change their attitudes due to spreading Insurgent propaganda amongst their constituents.  Hating to break with Cannon, but not wanting to risk their reelection, many of the “near Insurgents” began publicly and privately announcing never to vote for Cannon for Speaker again.  On March 15, the coalition of Insurgents and Democrats struck out a provision in legislative, executive, and judicial appropriations bill for the maintenance of government supplied automobiles used by Speaker Cannon and Vice-President Sherman.  On March 16, Representative Crumpacker of Indiana asked for consideration on a resolution concerning the census, claiming it had constitutional privilege because the Constitution made taking the census mandatory.  The coalition would not hear of it since it was “Calendar Wednesday,” but on March 17, Crumpacker resubmitted his resolution which promptly passed.  Crumpacker’s resolution struck a cord with several of the Insurgents, who began insisting that “business prescribed by the Constitution is privileged, despite any rule” (Lowry, 8).  The Insurgents felt that since the Constitution states that the House may make its own rules of procedure, a resolution pertaining to the rules would have constitutional privilege (Lowry, 8).    
On March 17, George Norris pulled from his pocket a resolution he had carried for some time, and demanded to be recognized.  Norris’ resolution increased the size of the Rules Committee to fifteen members and removed the Speaker from its ranks.  Representative Dalzell instantly rose declaring the resolution out of order, Norris objected.  In Norris’ opinion his resolution was not out of order because of the concept of constitutional privilege just established by the Crumpacker resolution.  Instantly contriversy arose as to whether or not Norris’ resolution really had constitutional privilege; Cannon’s supporters felt it did not, while the Insurgents felt it did.  Norris claimed no responsibility for the situation the House found itself in because he had voted against Crumpacker’s resolution, but in order to be consistent he felt his resolution must be held privileged as all the rest.  For the moment, the decision fell on Cannon’s shoulders; he could either rule in favor of considering Norris’ resolution or rejecting it.  Unfortunately, either decision would be disastrous for Cannon because if he ruled in favor, the resolution would be adopted by a vote of the coalition; his decision would be overturned by the same vote if he rejected the resolution.  In that case, the resolution would be automatically open to the vote, and Cannon would be stripped of much of his power.  The House remained deadlocked for twenty-six hours while Cannon decided on a ruling.  Finally, at two o’clock on March 18, Cannon made his ruling on the resolution.  He had run his course, the Insurgents proved their point; they humbled the once powerful “Uncle Joe” Cannon (Lowry 8, 33).
Cannon would go on and serve in the House until 1923, then officially retiring after 48 years of faithful service to his country.  Few Congressmen ever expressed their viewpoints as adamantly as “Uncle Joe” Cannon, and he would be the first person featured on the cover of Time magazine, appearing in its first issue the year he retired.  He would remain the most powerful Speaker every to preside over the House, no Speaker following Cannon would be able to match his power and influence, though Nicholas Longworth came close in the twenties.  Cannon would also remain the longest serving Republican Speaker until 2006 when he was surpassed by fellow Illinoisan Dennis Hastert.  The Revolt of 1910 would completely reshape the way the House went about its business.  The seniority system was officially established, and the Speaker was reduced to little more than a presiding officer.  This has not changed up until this point, and probably never will.  Cannon died November 12, 1926 from a weakened heart and the general effects of old age, yet the legacy he left behind was historic.  

Works Cited 
Gwinn, William G. Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of Insurgency; A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism. Thesis. University of Notre Dame, 1953. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966. 
Lawrence, Eric D., Forrest Maltzman, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. "The Politics of Speaker Cannon's Committee Assignments." American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 551-62.
 Lowry, Edward G. "The Downfall of Cannon." Harper's Weekly 26 Mar. 1910: 8+. 28 Retrieved Jan. 2009 <http://app.harpweek.com/default.asp>. 
Rager, Scott W. The Fall of the House of Cannon: Uncle Joe and His Enemies. 1903-1910. Thesis. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1991. 
"The Next Speaker of the House of Representatives." Harper's Weekly 10 Jan. 1093: 70. Retrieved 28 Jan. 2009 <http://app.harpweek.com/default.asp>.